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Abstract—We discuss the issue of what we call incentive
mismatch, a fundamental problem with public blockchains sup-
ported by economic incentives. This is an open problem, but one
potential solution is to make application portable. Portability
is desirable for applications on private blockchains. Then, we
present examples of middleware designs that enable applica-
tion portability and, in particular, support migration between
blockchains.
Index Terms—blockchain, incentive mismatch, application
portability, migration between blockchains
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain is extending its field of applications, not limited
to cryptocurrency, due to its ability to provide us a kind of trust
even with no centralized entity such as a government as shown
in Figure 1.
Incentive mismatch is a fundamental problem with public
blockchains. The incentive for nodes to support a blockchain
is economic, i.e., gaining coins, and is different from the
incentives for blockchain applications. An application cannot
continue working if its underlying blockchain collapses due
to the economic motivation disappearing. It is non-trivial to
align the blockchain node and application incentives, and this
is still an open problem.
Making applications portable is one potential solution to
protecting them against collapsing along with their underlying
blockchains. Portability is also desirable for applications on
private blockchains. In fact, minimizing the dependence of
applications on their underlying middleware is a well-known
best practice.
However, current blockchain middlewares provide their own
application programming interfaces (APIs), making an appli-
cation written for one middleware difficult to port to another.
It is not even clear that it would always be possible to design
common API functions, because each middleware uses its own
abstractions, such as Ethereum’s Solidity language.
In this paper, we introduce the incentive mismatch problem
and discuss application portability as a potential solution.
Then, we present software architectures and techniques for
enabling application migration between blockchains.
II. BENEFITS OF APPLICATION PORTABILITY
Portability is a desirable property for applications on both
public and private blockchains, although the reasons are some-
what different.
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Fig. 1. A blockchain depicted as a distributed system.
A. Applications on public blockchains
Public blockchains have a fundamental problem we call
incentive mismatch: blockchain nodes and applications do not
share a common incentive. Public blockchain transactions are
confirmed by Proof of Work [1], and derivatives such as Proof
of Stake [2] and Proof of Elapsed Time [3], that are based
on the nodes’ economic incentives. The nodes simply try to
gain coins and have no direct incentive to support particular
applications.
If a public blockchain cannot provide sufficient economic
incentives to its supporting nodes, it loses the ability to confirm
transactions securely. For example, a fall in coin prices might
lead to some of its nodes defecting, and reducing its ability to
confirm transactions. Blockchains with fewer supporting nodes
are also more vulnerable to attacks such as majority (51%)
attacks and eclipse attacks [4], [5]. For example, in May 2018,
attacks against public blockchains supporting cryptocurrencies
succeeded in a row. In case of Monacoin, attackers voided
over 20 blocks that had previously been confirmed by a block
withholding attack. In case of Bitcoin Gold, attacker voided
22 or more blocks and succeeded double-spending of coin.
This means that blockchain applications have no control over
the confirmation ability they are based on and, hence, they can
collapse due to economic circumstances.
Is it possible to align the incentives of the nodes supporting
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Fig. 2. Two application portability levels.
a blockchain and the applications on it? The currency sys-
tem that supports a public blockchain is itself a blockchain
application, because it utilizes the blockchain’s confirmation
ability. Their incentives match by design; however, this is a
special case. The incentives also match if the same entity
both deploys and operates the blockchain nodes and runs the
application; however, in that case it essentially becomes a
private blockchain.
Otherwise, public blockchains and their applications gener-
ally have no common incentive. Whether or not it is possible
to align their incentives, i.e., design a mechanism that enables
applications to ensure they retain this confirmation ability, is
an open problem. However, making application portable is
one potential solution to this problem: if an application is
portable (i.e., migratable), we can simply migrate it to another
blockchain if the current one collapses (Section III).
B. Applications on private blockchains
Portability is also a desirable property for applications on
private blockchains. If it is difficult to port a given application,
it may suffer from so-called vendor lock-in, preventing, for
example, the application and its users benefiting from a
different and better middleware platform. For example, an
application and its users cannot benefit from a better another
middleware. At worst, this means the application will die along
with its underlying middleware if that middleware becomes too
old and stale to use.
III. APPLICATION PORTABILITY
There are several different levels of application portability.
As Figure 2 shows, here, we focus on the following two levels.
1) Runnable : The application can run on different
blockchains, but cannot migrate from one to another.
2) Migratable : Both the application and its data can
migrate from one blockchain to another.
Using a common blockchain API enables runnable porta-
bility. Applications are also clearly portable between different
blockchains running the same middleware. However, it is less
clear whether we can design common API functions for use
by different middlewares, because they often adopt different
abstractions, for example adopting a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) instead of a hash chain of blocks. In addition, each
middleware has its own smart contract mechanism, such as
Ethereum’s Solidity language. However, applications can still
be portable if we limit the blockchain functions they use and
provide a common API for this (more limited) set of functions.
For example, all blockchains should support storing a hashed
value together with its time stamp, and we can provide a
common API for that function.
If an application is portable at the runnable level, it can
only be migrated to another blockchain by restarting it in
its initial state and accepting the loss of all the accumulated
data. Because proof of data existence of and verification of
state changes are fundamental blockchain features, migration
without the logs needed to enable those features (Section IV-A)
is unlikely to be useful. In contrast, the migratable portability
level enables applications to survive both the loss of private
blockchain middleware (Section II-B) and the collapse of an
underlying public blockchain (Section II-A).
IV. MIGRATING APPLICATIONS BETWEEN BLOCKCHAINS
In this section, we discuss a method of enabling applica-
tion migration between blockchains, and present preliminary
middleware designs based on it.
A. Data to be migrated
What data should be migrated between blockchains? When
an application that does not depend on a blockchain is
migrated between middlewares, it is generally sufficient to
migrate its current state, for example, records in relational
databases. However, one of the strongest reasons for using
blockchains is that they can prove data existed at a given
time in the past and verify state (data) changes. In this case,
migrating just the application’s current state is not enough;
the logs enabling these proof and verification processes must
also be migrated. Thus, we need to migrate the following two
types of data.
1) Current state of the application
2) Logs – metadata of the states that describe state changes
and their time stamps.
In currency applications such as Bitcoin, for example, the
former data are account balances, although, in Bitcoin, these
are not explicitly recorded and can instead be calculated by
adding up related transactions. The latter data are transactions,
that describe balance changes and their time stamps.
B. Middleware design that enables migration
We adopt the following two principles to design migration-
friendly middleware.
• Minimize dependence on specific blockchain middleware.
The only requirement for our middleware design is to
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Fig. 3. A software architecture that improves application portability by limiting dependency on a blockchain.
support the storage of simple data items, such as numbers
or byte sequences, together with associated time stamps.
• Do not expect to be able to retain trust in the original
(source) blockchain.
One of the main reasons for an application to leave
its current blockchain is imminent collapse of the
blockchain, for example, due to the loss of too many
nodes (Section II-A). In such a situation, we cannot
continue to rely on the previous blockchain.
Figure 3 shows two candidates for middleware designs
that enable migration between blockchains. To minimize the
dependences discussed above, these only expect the underlying
blockchain to support recording a set of numbers and a time
stamp with its indexing key (e.g. account ID such as Bitcoin
address). At most, we expect a time-stamped byte sequence.
We will investigate enabling migration while supporting more
features than this in future work.
In the design shown in Figure 3 (b), we have chosen to
store the data in an external database, not in the blockchain,
although the blockchain still contains information that must be
migrated. The Beyond Blockchain One (BBc-1) blockchain
middleware [6] adopts such a design. This approach re-
duces the blockchain size, which is advantageous because the
blockchain is copied to all nodes and thus occupies storage
space on all of them. In addition, if an application does not
require certain state (data) changes to be verified, we can
update the data simply by overwriting it in the database, further
reducing the storage requirements.
With the design shown in Figure 3 (b), we must also
ensure the database is sufficiently fault-tolerant to achieve
enough data availability. We can achieve this by utilizing
replication or erasure coding [7], which are supported by
most distributed databases, and adjusting the fault tolerance
level by configuring the number of replicas or the erasure
coding parameters. This flexibility is an advantage over the
design shown in Figure 3 (a) that simply copying everything
to all the blockchain nodes. Currently, such highly-available
databases are provided as public cloud services and we can
even store data in multiple databases instances across different
cloud providers.
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Fig. 4. Design choices for blockchains supporting application migration.
In the design shown in Figure 3 (b), if an application
does not require verification of state (data) changes, we can
overwrite data in the database when they are updated. It
reduces the amount of storage occupation further.
Figure 4 summarizes the design choices for blockchains
supporting application migration.
C. Migration process
If an application requires access to all the logs (Section
IV-A) in the original (source) blockchain, the middleware must
provide such access. However, we do not expect to be able to
continue trusting the source blockchain (Section IV-B), for
security reasons. Furthermore, it is safer not to rely on the
source blockchain’s middlewares to still be running and acces-
sible online. In any case, we cannot generally control public
blockchains, and maintaining private blockchain middleware
requires human effort and CPU resources. Thus, we need a
way of maintaining access to previous blockchain logs without
requiring the original blockchain to continue to be trustworthy,
or even exist.
Figure 5 shows a migration process that meets these re-
quirements. The middleware stores a static copy of the source
blockchain, truncating it at the expiration time, and accesses
the stored blockchain. Here, the middleware sets the source
blockchain’s expiration time to just before the migration. The
BlockchainBlockchain
Expiration time
of this blockchain
Store
- Hashed value
- Expiration time
Immutable
(and truncated after the expiration time) Running
….
Migration
A hash function
Fig. 5. Technique for migrating an application between blockchains.
Fig. 6. A network coordinate representing about 10,000 Bitcoin nodes (in
millisecond).
expiration time would be specified in block height because
real-time time stamps can be manipulated to some degree.
Saving a static copy obviates the need for the blockchain
middleware to continue running, and truncating it allows us to
stop trusting the blockchain after the expiration time.
Then, the middleware creates a hash chain of the saved
blockchains as shown in Figure 5. This hash chain enables it to
detect any alterations of the saved blockchains, thus, proving
it has not been modified, and confirm the stored expiration
time is correct.
Here we have to remember that it is possible for a once-
confirmed block to be voided in a public blockchain. It also
happens naturally as well as by attacks mentioned in Section
II-A. It seems that an application on the blockchain can just
ignore such invalidation, because the application relies only
on the saved blockchains, not still-running old blockchains.
Though there may be cases in which the application has to take
account of the block invalidation. In those cases the statically
saved blockchains are also to be updated. At least, expiration
time of the saved blockchain has to be rewinded to a still-
valid block. Anyway, we want to avoid such updates, that are
time-consuming and halt the application for the updates. We
are trying to reduce block propagation latency among nodes,
that is the reason of naturally-happening fork and resulting
block invalidation. The techniques for reducing would be
neighbor selection or route selection [8]. Such neighbor and
route selections for performance requires network proximity
information between nodes. Therefore, first, we are trying
to establish a technique to estimate communication latencies
between nodes using network coordinates such as Vivaldi [9].
Figure 6 shows communication latencies among Bitcoin nodes
estimated using Vivaldi on a two-dimensional Euclidean plane.
The next step in this activity is accuracy improvement.
The middleware also has to be able to interpret all possible
source blockchains, which may be in a variety of formats.
However, developing such interpreting functions takes signif-
icant effort, and the resulting software is likely to be com-
plicated and bug-prone. Therefore, we would prefer to simply
abandon the source blockchains if the application allows it. For
applications that need to prove data exists but not verify state
changes, we can abandon the source blockchain after copying
the metadata needed to prove the data exist (and the data
themselves in the case of Figure 3 (a)) to the new blockchain.
If we take this approach, though, how can we prove the
copied metadata are correct without the original metadata?
The trust provided by blockchains is based on verifiable data;
however, such a copying approach means the copied metadata
are not verifiable because they are not explicitly connected
to the original metadata. Although the application trusts the
middleware that performed the copy, trust based on software
correctness is weaker than trust gained through verifiable data
because, for example, the middleware is subject to human
mistakes. The next-best solution to this problem would be to
make the copying program verifiable, possibly by saving both
it and its hashed value somewhere.
V. CONCLUSION
Applications for public blockchains are subject to the par-
ticular issue of incentive mismatch between the applications
and the blockchain nodes. This is because public blockchains
are driven by different economic incentives than the applica-
tions that run on them, and are not under the applications’
control. Because of this, an application may also fail if its
underlying blockchain collapses, unless it is not just portable
but migratable.
These blockchain application survivability issues have mo-
tivated us to investigate application portability and migration.
In this paper, we have presented middleware designs that
facilitate application migration between blockchains, together
with more efficient alternative designs for applications with
fewer requirements.
Making applications portable and migratable is both gen-
erally desirable and a potential solution to the incentive
mismatch problem with public blockchains. It would be better
still for the blockchain to be supported by the applications
themselves, not the nodes’ economic incentives. We can call
it an incentive-matched blockchain if the public blockchain is
always supported solely by the applications. However, how to
design such a mechanism remains an open problem.
Bodies such as the ISO have begun standardizing distributed
ledgers, and the IETF and W3C have discussed such matters
as well. However, it is challenging just to design an effective
common blockchain API and migration between blockchains
lies even further in the future. Today, software is implemented
first and its specification is written after it gains much pop-
ularity. It is implementation-first, not specification-first. For
instance, the first Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) came
more than two and a half years after the Bitcoin network was
launched. Following this paper, our effective next step will be
to demonstrate applications that are portable and migratable.
In future work, we plan to study the portability of program
code and data for smart contracts, a topic this paper has been
barely touched on. Even on the same middleware platform, it
is difficult to update the data format or program code while
retaining existing data.
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